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Abstract
This paper examines the eects of antiretroviral therapy (ART) on demand for
HIV testing and of ART-induced testing on demand for risky sexual behavior. I pro-
vide a model of sexual behavior decision-making under uncertainty and estimate the
structural parameters of the model using nationally representative survey data from
Zambia on HIV testing decisions before and after the introduction of ART. The empir-
ical results indicate that although the introduction of ART increased demand for HIV
testing, the ART allocation process limited the prevention benet of ART-induced test-
ing. Simulation results show that eliminating this prevention ineciency while holding
the supply of ART constant would increase the prevention impact of ART-induced test-
ing more than four-fold. More generally, the analysis indicates that existing studies
which examine \universal" testing or quasi-experimental testing programs understate
the ecacy of standard voluntary counseling and testing programs.
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Policymakers believe that HIV testing is an important intervention in the HIV/AIDS pan-
demic. Proponents of HIV testing presume that on average individuals who learn whether
or not they are infected will respond to this new information by reducing risky behavior.
However, HIV testing rates are low in much of the world and a vast majority of HIV positive
individuals are not aware that they are infected. For example, among the 67 percent of the
world population infected with HIV/AIDS that reside in Sub-Saharan Africa only 10 percent
know their HIV status (UNAIDS 2008, WHO 2006a).
One of the main mechanisms by which policymakers hope to increase demand for HIV
testing is increased availability of subsidized antiretroviral therapy (Global HIV Prevention
Working Group 2004). The availability of antiretroviral therapy (ART) gives individuals a
direct incentive to take a HIV test: if they take a HIV test and are HIV positive then they
may begin therapy, reducing morbidity and prolonging life. However, the incentive eects
of ART may be heterogeneous and many individuals may not choose to test in response to
the introduction of ART. Moreover, those who test because of ART may not demonstrate
substantial behavior change subsequent to testing.
This paper examines the eect of ART availability on demand for HIV testing and the
eect of ART-induced testing on demand for risky behavior. I present a model of demand
for HIV testing and for risky behavior. Initially I assume that the conditions under which
individuals have an incentive to test and testing reduces risky behavior hold. In particular,
I assume that demand for risky behavior is concave in the prior probability of being HIV
positive. Under these conditions, I show that in the pre-ART era it is the riskiest individ-
uals (i.e., individuals with the highest prior probabilities of being HIV positive) who have
the greatest incentive to test in the setting examined in the current analysis. The riskiest
individuals are also those individuals whose testing decisions should be most responsive to
the introduction of ART. I show that under these same conditions the expected reduction in
risky behavior associated with taking a HIV test in this setting should be increasing in the
prior probability an individual is HIV positive. Thus, ART-induced testing has the potential
to substantially reduce the spread of HIV/AIDS.
Using newly assembled data from before and after the introduction of ART in Zambia I
examine the empirical evidence on these predictions. Testing behavior among women and
men prior to the introduction of ART is consistent with the prediction that individuals with
the highest prior probabilities of being HIV positive are those who should be most likely
to test. The change in testing behavior among women after the introduction of ART is
1consistent with the prediction that individuals with the highest prior probabilities of being
HIV positive are those who should demonstrate the greatest response to the availability of
ART. However, the change in testing behavior among men after the introduction of ART is
not consistent with this prediction. Specically, testing decisions among older men appear to
be particularly responsive to the introduction of ART despite the fact that older men are one
of the lowest HIV prevalence groups in Zambia. In contrast, testing decisions among men in
the middle of the age distribution are not particularly responsive to the introduction of ART
despite the fact that these men are one of the higher HIV prevalence groups. Although data
on the age distribution of ART patients in Zambia are not available, I interpret these results
as evidence of a non-random rationing mechanism determining the allocation of ART among
HIV positive individuals (in favor of older males) and provide evidence rejecting alternative
hypotheses. In any case, from the perspective of maximizing the prevention impact of ART-
induced testing, the results indicate an ineciency in the process determining who seeks and
receives ART.
I estimate the structural parameters of the model and show that the conditions for
individuals to have an incentive to test and for testing to reduce risky behavior are indeed
satised in this setting. Moreover, the structural parameter estimates allow me to simulate
the eect of ART availability on testing demand and the eects of ART-induced testing
on demand for risky behavior and on the spread of HIV/AIDS. As part of the simulations,
I examine the eects of eliminating the prevention ineciency in the process determining
the allocation of ART and/or expanding the supply of ART. Simulation results show that
under the existing policy ART availability increased testing demand by approximately 3
percentage points and ART-induced testing reduced the incidence of HIV by less than 2
percent. Expanding the supply of antiretroviral drugs without eliminating the prevention
ineciency would only have moderate eects on testing rates and risky behavior. In contrast,
eliminating the prevention ineciency while holding xed the existing supply of antiretroviral
drugs would more than quadruple ART-induced testing and the number of new infections
avoided due to ART-induced testing.
This analysis yields three broader insights about the economics of HIV/AIDS and health
economics more generally. First, this paper shows that with a small amount of theoretical
structure we can estimate the parameters of the risky behavior demand function without
actually observing risky sexual behavior. Because self-reported sexual behavior is subject
to substantial reporting bias (Gersovitz et al 1998), the indirect approach to estimating the
risky behavior demand function implemented in the current analysis may be superior to a
2direct approach.1
Second, this paper provides a counterpoint to the argument that treatment for an in-
fectious disease diminishes prevention eorts by reducing the private benet of preventive
behavior and, in the case of HIV/AIDS, by increasing vector activity. In contexts where un-
certainty about about one's own infection status is an important factor in decision-making
about preventive behavior, treatment for an infectious disease may actually increase private
prevention eorts.2
Third, this analysis shows that the selection induced by the voluntary, unpaid nature
of truly voluntary counseling and testing (VCT) means that these programs yield a larger
average eect of testing on risky sexual behavior than do \universal" or conditional cash
transfer (CCT) approaches to HIV testing. Some have suggested that governments conduct
door-to-door testing campaigns (e.g., Donnelly 2005) and/or implement an opt-out approach
to testing whereby individuals are oered a HIV test during any visit to a health care provider
(e.g., UNAIDS/WHO 2004, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 2006, Granich et al
2009). However, the ndings in Boozer and Philipson (2000) suggest that these universal
testing campaigns may have little-to-no eect on aggregate risky behavior even if they are
successful at getting individuals to take a HIV test. Similarly, the ndings in Thornton
(2008) suggest that inducing individuals to take a HIV test by oering a nancial incentive
(i.e., a conditional cash transfer approach to HIV testing) will generate little-to-no change
in average risky sexual behavior.
In contrast, I show that if the risky behavior demand function is concave in the prior
probability of being HIV positive, then getting everyone to test (or inducing testing among
a random sample of the population) will yield less behavior change per person than an
approach to testing where individuals simply self-select into testing. In the setting examined
in the current analysis, the additional selection into testing induced by the introduction of
1A related point is that instead of examining the eect of HIV testing on a single or a handful of risky
behavior measures, I examine the eect of HIV testing on the cumulative risk of acquiring HIV.
2For the particular disease I examine in this analysis, HIV/AIDS, the net eect of treatment (i.e., ART)
on preventive behavior is unclear. I show that ART-induced HIV testing increases preventive behavior. In
contrast, Lakdawalla et al (2006) show that the introduction of highly-active antiretroviral therapy (HAART)
in the United States increased the number of sex partners of the representative HIV positive individual and
suggest that this was due to the improved health and longevity of HIV positive individuals receiving HAART.
Although this is an important nding, the model I present here focuses on the eect of ART-induced testing
on demand for risky behavior. Because Lakdawalla et al (2006) do not consider the role of ART-induced
testing in behavior change and the current study does not incorporate the Lakdawalla et al (2006) mechanism,
writing a more general model simultaneously allowing for these two eects may be a useful avenue for future
research. However, it may be dicult to reliably estimate the structural parameters of an expanded model.
3ART increases the prevention eects of HIV testing. In fact, truly voluntary counseling and
testing (VCT) programs are the predominant approach to HIV testing and increasing access
to ART remains a priority in HIV/AIDS policy in Sub-Saharan Africa and elsewhere in the
developing world.
2 Setting
Zambia has one of the highest rates of HIV prevalence in the world. According to the anony-
mous HIV testing component of the 2001 Zambia Demographic and Health Survey (ZDHS),
the HIV prevalence rate among adults age 15-49 is 14.5 percent. High HIV prevalence in
Zambia is not a recent development. Data from antenatal clinics in the sentinel surveillance
program are consistent with the hypothesis that HIV prevalence has remained relatively
stable from the early 1990s onwards (UNAIDS/WHO 2006).
As in many Sub-Saharan African countries (i.e., high prevalence countries), the highest
rates of HIV prevalence are among individuals in the middle of the age distribution. Figure
1 presents the results of a locally weighted smoothed regression of an indicator variable for
HIV status on age, estimated separately for females and for males in the 2001 ZDHS. As
shown in Figure 1, HIV prevalence is highest among individuals in the middle of the age
distribution, prevalence is slightly higher among women than among men, and the age of peak
prevalence among females is less than that among males (34 and 40 years, respectively). The
average age dierence in sexual partners may explain this last fact. Data from the Zambia
Sexual Behavior Survey (ZSBS) on the age of sexual partners show that on average males
are approximately six years older than their female sexual partners.
[FIGURE 1 APPROXIMATELY HERE]
Magruder (2010) provides an explanation for the inverted U-shape that characterizes the
prevalence-age proles of most high HIV prevalence countries. Individuals in early adulthood
engage in \marital shopping" (i.e., the search for a potential marital partner) and experience
higher than average turnover in sexual partners. The eect of this behavior on prevalence is
magnied by the biology of the HIV virus: infectiousness during the rst month of having
acquired HIV is much higher than during the majority of the life course of the virus (Wawer et
al 2005) and rapid turnover of sexual partners during the period of having recently acquired
HIV can lead to a sharp increase in incidence and prevalence.
As part of its eorts to combat the HIV/AIDS pandemic, the government of Zambia
began oering free voluntary counseling and testing (VCT) in 1998. The VCT approach to
4HIV testing, in which individuals have to choose to visit a health clinic to take a HIV test,
is the predominant approach to HIV testing around the world. Although initially rates of
HIV testing in Zambia were low, they are increasing. According to the ZSBS, the proportion
of individuals voluntarily taking a HIV test in the 12 months prior to the survey round
increased from between 5.5 and 6 percent in 2000 and 2003 to over 10 percent for women
and nearly 8 percent for men in 2005.
One possible explanation for the increase in testing rates is that free antiretroviral ther-
apy (ART) became available in Zambia around this time. The early 21st century witnessed
a dramatic expansion in the provision of antiretroviral therapy in Sub-Saharan Africa. Be-
tween 2000 and the end of 2005, the number of individuals on ART in the region increased
from fewer than 50,000 (Attawell and Mundy 2003) to 810,000 (WHO 2006b). Zambia is a
participant in this expansion and in May 2004 the government of Zambia began to provide
ART free of charge at primary health care centers (Stringer et al 2006).
The introduction of free antiretroviral therapy in Zambia may have increased testing
demand by providing those individuals who believed they may have been HIV positive with
an added incentive to test.3 However, other factors aecting testing rates could have changed
during the period as well. For example, the number of VCT sites increased between 2000-03
and 2005.
If the introduction of ART had a causal eect on testing demand, then we should ex-
pect to see an inverse relationship between distance to the nearest ART site and the change
in testing rates between 2000-03 and 2005. The ZSBS includes information on the Stan-
dard Enumeration Area (SEA) of residence of each respondent.4 In addition, the Japanese
International Cooperation Agency 2004 Health Facilities Census (HFC) provides global po-
sitioning system (GPS) information for each of the ART sites open at the time of the 2005
survey round of the ZSBS. For the 2000, 2003, and 2005 survey rounds of the ZSBS, I cal-
3Although not all HIV positive individuals were clinically eligible for ART, it seems unlikely that clinical
eligibility conditioned the testing response to the introduction of free ART. World Health Organization
guidelines for resource-limited settings recommend initiating ART after CD4 counts fall below 200 cells/mm3
(WHO 2006c). However, it is unlikely that many individuals in the population were aware of the clinical
guidelines for ART eligibility and even more unlikely that individuals had any precise sense of their CD4
count prior to testing positive for HIV and having their CD4 count taken. Moreover, even those individuals
who knew the clinical guidelines and had a precise belief about their CD4 count would have an added
incentive to test after ART was introduced if they thought they might be HIV positive. Testing positive
would initiate a regular series of CD4 tests, allowing the individual to begin ART as soon as clinically possible
(or at least take a place in the queue).
4The Standard Enumeration Area (SEA) is the smallest administrative unit in the Zambian Census.
There are more than 15,000 SEAs in Zambia.
5culate the centroid distance from the SEA of residence for each respondent to the nearest
ART site that was open at the time of the 2004 HFC.
Figure 2 presents the results of a locally weighted smoothed regression of an indicator
variable equal to one if the individual voluntarily took a HIV test in the 12 months prior to
the survey month on distance to the (eventual) location of the nearest ART site, estimated
separately for the pre-ART and ART periods. In the pre-ART period, individuals closer to
sites that eventually provided ART were more likely to test. Nonetheless, the increase in
testing rates associated with the ART period is greatest for those individuals closest to ART
sites. Of course an important omitted variable in this analysis is the distance to the nearest
VCT site; proximity to a VCT site aects the testing decision and is positively correlated
with proximity to an ART site. However, health clinics in which ART was introduced in 2004
and 2005 tended to be sites that had previously provided VCT services and the pre-ART
regression line reects this fact.5
[FIGURE 2 APPROXIMATELY HERE]
Although it appears that the introduction of subsidized ART caused an increase in aggre-
gate testing demand, there exists substantial heterogeneity across demographic groups in the
change in testing demand associated with this intervention. Figure 3 shows the testing-age
prole for women prior to the availability of ART and after the introduction of ART. Prior
to the availability of ART, women in the middle of the age distribution were most likely to
take a HIV test. These women were also those with the highest HIV prevalence. After ART
was introduced in Zambia testing increased among women of all ages, but the increase was
largest for the women in the middle of the age distribution. These dierences by age are
consistent with the idea that ART availability increased testing demand and the incentive
eect of ART on testing demand is greatest for those individuals with the highest probability
of being HIV positive.6
[FIGURE 3 APPROXIMATELY HERE]
5The expansion in VCT between the pre-ART and ART periods occurred largely in areas that were not
close to ART sites and hence may explain the increase in testing rates among individuals further from ART
sites in 2005.
6Although an expansion in the prevention-of-mother-to-child (PMTCT) program paralleled the intro-
duction of free ART in Zambia, this expansion does not fully explain the results presented in Figure 3.
Disaggregating the analysis by whether the respondent reports being pregnant in the 12 months prior to the
survey month does not substantially aect the results.
6For males, the pattern is noticeably dierent. Figure 4 shows the testing-age prole for
men prior to the availability of ART and after the introduction of ART. As with females,
in the \pre" period it is men in the middle of the age distribution that were most likely to
take a HIV test. Likewise, these men were also those with the highest HIV prevalence. In
the \post" period, however, it is the oldest males that are most likely to take a HIV test.
It appears that the idea that individuals with the highest probability of being HIV positive
should have testing decisions that are most responsive to ART availability cannot explain
the observed patterns of testing demand among males.
[FIGURE 4 APPROXIMATELY HERE]
Although much of the change between 2000-03 and 2005 in the testing-age proles for
females and for males may be attributed to the introduction of ART, it may be that the
explanation for the large increase in testing rates among older males (and perhaps that among
women in the middle of the age distribution) lies elsewhere. One change that paralleled the
introduction of ART in Zambia was a continued expansion in the number of VCT sites.
Nonetheless, it is unlikely that the expansion in the number of testing sites caused the
observed changes in the testing-age proles for women and for men. For the expansion in
VCT sites to explain these changes, the expansion should have decreased the distance to the
nearest VCT site dierentially by age. Furthermore, the age dierential in the expansion
intensity should have diered by gender.
The ideal test of this hypothesis would be to semiparametrically regress the change in
the distance to the nearest VCT site on measures of each individual's age, gender, and
interactions thereof. Unfortunately, data on which of the VCT sites open in 2005 existed
prior to the introduction of ART in Zambia do not exist. In lieu of such data, we may examine
the relationship between distance to the nearest VCT site and age in 2005. If the change
in the distance to the nearest VCT site is correlated with age and gender, then we should
expect to see evidence of spatial clustering by age/gender and possibly evidence of substantial
dierences by age in distance to the nearest VCT site in 2005. The HFC includes GPS
information for VCT sites and for each respondent in the 2005 ZSBS I construct a measure
of the distance to the nearest VCT site. Figure 5 presents the results of a locally weighted
smoothed regression of distance to the nearest VCT site on age, estimated separately for
females and males. There are small dierences by age and gender in the average distance
to the nearest VCT site, but these dierences do not readily explain the changes in the
testing-age proles (e.g., older males and males in the middle of the age distribution appear
7to reside at similar distances from VCT sites). Moreover, the overall atness of the distance-
age proles suggests that individuals are not spatially clustered by age. Thus, it appears
that the expansion in the number of VCT sites between 2003 and 2005 does not explain the
large increase in testing rates among older males.
[FIGURE 5 APPROXIMATELY HERE]
A plausible explanation for the large testing response among older males associated with
the introduction of ART is that there exists a non-random rationing mechanism for allocating
ART. The supply of antiretroviral drugs in Zambia is insucient to ensure that all individuals
who are HIV positive and require ART are guaranteed coverage.7 If supply-side constraints
mean that priority for access to ART depends on an individual's age and gender or factors
correlated with these characteristics, then we would expect to see the observed changes in
testing-age proles deviate from those predicted by a simple model of testing demand where
the incentive eect of ART is increasing in the prior probability that the individual is HIV
positive.8
Social norms in Zambia are consistent with the notion that older males receive prior-
ity for access to ART. Although there may exist variation across the more than seventy
ethnolinguistic groups in Zambia, in much of traditional Zambian society younger men are
subordinate to older men (Bond 1982). The oldest resident male is generally identied as
the household head (Scudder 1962). Among the Tonga ethnic group, one of the largest in
Zambia, an elder is called mupati or \big person" (Colson and Scudder 1981). Among the
7Rosen et al (2005) examine ART coverage, dened as the ratio of the number of individuals medically
eligible for ART therapy to those receiving ART, as of December 2004 in nine Sub-Saharan African countries.
Estimated ART coverage ranges from two percent in Nigeria to fty percent in Botswana. Estimated ART
coverage in Zambia, 13 percent, is slightly higher than the median coverage rate in these nine countries. To
the extent that not all individuals who were eligible for ART had visited a health clinic and taken a HIV
test, this gure overstates the extent of excess demand for ART in Zambia at the time of the 2005 ZSBS.
Nonetheless, rough calculations presented in the simulations section of the current analysis suggest that well
below 100 percent of individuals who were eligible for ART and took a HIV test in this period were able to
receive ART.
8Evidence from other contexts indicates that the rationing of scarce medical care is often based on demo-
graphic characteristics or factors correlated with these characteristics. McGough et al (2005) reviews four
major technological developments in health care - insulin for diabetes, penicillin, hemodialysis, and liver
transplants - and the associated rationing policies. In all four cases, rationing policies used demographic cri-
teria, or criteria correlated with demographic characteristics (e.g., military service). Moreover, hemodialysis
rationing explicitly favored prime-age workers, heads of household, and active participants in community
aairs.
8Bemba ethnic group, another of the largest ethnic groups in Zambia, males are not consid-
ered to be fully adult members of the community until they are married and have children.
Older males, or bakalamba, control decision-making not just within their kin group, but also
more broadly within the community. They are gures of authority and largely control village
decision-making (Epstein 1981).
Although scant, direct evidence on the process determining the allocation of ART among
HIV positive individuals is also consistent with the idea that older males receive priority in
this process. Two of the main groups that are documented as receiving priority for access
to ART are richer individuals and individuals with political connections (e.g., civil servants)
(Jones 2004, Bwalya 2006). Despite the lack of direct evidence on age-based preferences, it
is likely that older men represent a disproportionate share of these two groups.
Thus, although it appears that ART availability in Zambia increased testing demand,
the change in demand is consistent with the existence of a non-random ART allocation
mechanism. To frame the analysis of the eects of ART availability on demand for HIV
testing and of ART-induced testing on demand for risky sexual behavior, the next section
presents a simple model of demand for HIV testing and risky behavior. I then estimate the
parameters of the model and use these to quantify the magnitude of these eects.
3 Model
The changes in testing behavior associated with the introduction of ART are consistent
with the existence of a non-random rationing mechanism determining the allocation of ART
among HIV positive individuals. In particular it appears that priority for access to ART may
have been given to older males at the expense of males in the middle of the age distribution.
To examine this nding more rigorously, I present a model of demand for HIV testing and for
risky behavior. I match the model to the data and nd that the model ts pre-ART testing
behavior quite well but fails to match the change in testing behavior after the introduction of
ART. Thus, I expand the model to capture the eect of ART rationing or, more generally, the
eects of other factors correlated with demographic characteristics that may have conditioned
the testing response to the introduction of ART. Then I use the parameter estimates to
simulate the eect of ART availability on testing demand and demand for risky behavior
under several ART policies.
93.1 Basic setup
In this model an individual chooses whether to take a HIV test and chooses how much risky
behavior in which to engage. There are two components to expected utility: the pleasure the
individual derives from engaging in risky behavior (e.g., unprotected sex) and the displeasure
associated with acquiring HIV. Taking a HIV test means that the individual learns his HIV
status with certainty and allows him to avoid ex post errors in forming beliefs about the
marginal cost of risky behavior. In addition, when ART is available he may be able to begin
treatment if he tests HIV positive.
The individual is endowed with a prior probability of being HIV positive, p0 2 [0;1].
Given this probability, the individual forms expectations about the net benet of testing
and decides whether to take a HIV test. After deciding whether or not to take a HIV test
and learning the results if he chooses to test (and beginning treatment if he is HIV positive
and eligible), the individual chooses an amount of risky behavior in which to engage. The
amount of risky behavior in which the individual chooses to engage is summarized by the
probability that he is HIV positive after engaging in this risky behavior if in fact he was HIV
negative prior to this choice. Let p1 2 [0;1] denote this probability.
3.2 Demand for risky sexual behavior
Figure 6 provides a graphical representation of the mechanics of the model. For the moment,
consider the upper half of this gure. On the x-axis is the exogenous prior probability the
individual is HIV positive, p0. On the y-axis is the choice of risky behavior, p1. The concave
function, p1(p0), represents the risky behavior demand function if the individual does not take
a HIV test. Although the risky behavior demand function depicted in Figure 6 is increasing
and concave in p0, this function need not be increasing nor concave in p0 in practice and this
model does not assume this to be the case. If it is increasing and concave in p0, then the
model indicates a role for HIV testing in reducing risky behavior. I will explain why this is
the case momentarily.
[FIGURE 6 APPROXIMATELY HERE]
Suppose the individual knows with certainty that he is HIV negative (i.e., p0 = 0).
Then he will choose an amount of risky behavior given by p1(0). This is the y-intercept for
the p1(p0) function. Now suppose that the individual knows with certainty that he is HIV
positive (i.e., p0 = 1). Then he will choose an amount of risky behavior given by p1(1). Note
10that p1(0) and p1(1) are bounded below and above by zero and one but they need not equal
these values.
In this model, taking a HIV test and receiving the results means that the individual
knows his HIV status with certainty. Thus, if the individual takes a HIV test then he
will choose one of two possible choices of risky behavior: p1(0) or p1(1). The result of the
test determines which choice he will make. In expectation, the individual's choice of risky
behavior if he were to take a HIV test is simply the linear combination of these two points:
(1   p0)p1(0) + p0p1(1). This is the linear function in the upper half of Figure 6.
It should now be clear that the expected change in choice of risky behavior associated
with taking a HIV test is the dierence between the two functions plotted in the upper half
of Figure 6. That is, the expected change in risky behavior associated with taking a HIV
test is given by
(1   p0)p1(0) + p0p1(1)   p1(p0): (1)
If demand for risky behavior (i.e., p1(p0)) is concave in p0, then the sign of this expression
is negative and in expectation HIV testing will reduce risky behavior. Conversely, if p1(p0)
is convex, then the sign of this expression if positive and in expectation HIV testing will
increase risky behavior. To x ideas, I will restrict the following analysis to the case where
p1(p0) is concave and in expectation HIV testing will reduce risky behavior.
Let p denote the value of p0 that maximizes the expected reduction in risky behavior
associated with taking a HIV test. For p0 < p, the expected reduction in risky behavior
associated with taking a HIV test is increasing in p0. For p0  p, the expected reduction in
risky behavior associated with taking a HIV test is decreasing in p0.
3.3 Demand for HIV testing
Now consider the lower half of Figure 6. Again, on the x-axis is the exogenous prior prob-
ability the individual is HIV positive, p0. On the y-axis is expected utility. There are two
components to expected utility in this model: the utility derived from engaging in (risky)
sex and the utility loss associated with acquiring HIV. The utility derived from the choice of
risky sexual behavior, p1(p0), is denoted V (p1(p0)). The utility loss associated with acquir-
ing HIV is denoted . I assume that utility is additively separable in choice of risky sexual
behavior and health status.
The convex function in Figure 6, E[U(not test)], is the expected utility of not taking a
HIV test. Additive separability means that I may write the expected utility of not testing
11as
E[U(not test)] = V (p1(p0))   [1   (1   p0)(1   p1(p0))] (2)
where [1 (1 p0)(1 p1(p0))] is the probability that the individual is HIV positive conditional
on the prior probability of being HIV positive, p0, and on the probability that he acquires
HIV through his choice of risky behavior, p1(p0).
Although Figure 6 depicts the expected utility of not taking a HIV test as being decreasing
and convex in p0 this need not be the case in practice and this model does not assume this
to be true. If it is decreasing in p0, then the increase in the expected utility cost of becoming
HIV positive due to an increase in p0 (and the subsequent choice to increase p1) outweighs
the utility gain (if any) from engaging in a greater amount of risky behavior, p1(p0), that
results from the increase in p0. The convexity of E[U(not test)] follows from the fact that
the marginal cost of additional risky behavior is decreasing in the prior probability of being
HIV positive. As p0 increases, the expected utility of not testing falls because the probability
that the individual is HIV positive and incurs the associated utility cost is higher. On the
other hand, the loss in expected utility from an increase in p0 is partly oset by the increase
in choice of risky behavior (given the current assumption that p1(p0) is increasing in p0).
However, the increase in choice of risky behavior, p1, itself increases the probability that the
individual acquires HIV. The magnitude of this latter eect (although always non-negative)
is decreasing in p0 and hence E[U(not test)] is convex.
To understand the expected utility of testing in the absence of ART, rst consider the
case where the individual takes a HIV test and nds that he is HIV negative. Because he
knows that he is HIV negative with certainty, he will choose to engage in an amount of risky
behavior given by p1(0) and the only risk of acquiring HIV is because of this choice. Thus,
conditional on testing HIV negative his expected utility is
V (p1(0))   p1(0)   c (3)
where c is the utility cost of taking a HIV test. Now consider the case where the individual
takes a HIV test and nds that he is HIV positive. Because he knows that he is HIV positive
with certainty, he will choose to engage in an amount of risky behavior given by p1(1) and
is certain of incurring the utility cost of acquiring HIV. Thus, conditional on testing HIV
positive his expected utility is
V (p1(1))      c: (4)
12The expected utility of testing in the absence of ART is the linear combination of these two
conditional expectations, where the weights are the prior probabilities of being HIV negative
and of being HIV positive, respectively. That is, the expected utility of testing in the absence
of ART, denoted E[U(test)] in Figure 6, is
E[U(test)] = (1   p0)[V (p1(0))   p1(0)   c] + p0[V (p1(1))      c]: (5)
Assuming V (p1(0))   p1(0) > V (p1(1))    (i.e., the individual would prefer to engage in




With expressions for the expected utility of not testing and the expected utility of testing
in the absence of ART, it is possible to examine predictions about the pre-ART relationship
between the testing decision and the prior probability of being HIV positive. In the absence of
ART, the model predicts that demand for HIV testing should be greatest among individuals
in the middle of the p0 distribution. As long as the cost of testing is suciently high,
individuals with prior probabilities of being HIV positive that are either very low or very
high will not choose to take a HIV test and the only individuals who test will be those in
the middle of the p0 distribution. The prediction is apparent in the lower half of Figure
6: the expected utility of testing is greater than that of not testing only for individuals in
the middle of the p0 distribution. The intuition underlying this result is that the expected
change in risky behavior associated with taking a HIV test is relatively small for individuals
with very high (or very low) values of p0. It is individuals who are in the middle of the p0
distribution that have the largest expected change in demand for risky behavior associated
with taking a HIV test and hence the greatest willingness to pay for the test in the absence
of ART.
In this model the introduction of ART (without rationing) does not aect the risky be-
havior demand function or the expected utility of not testing, but it does aect the expected
utility of testing. Specically, the expected utility of testing increases by the prior prob-
ability that the individual is HIV positive times the net utility benet of beginning ART
conditional on being HIV positive. Let  denote the net utility of beginning ART con-
ditional on being HIV positive. Then the expected utility of testing when there is ART,
denoted E[U(test)] with ART in Figure 6, is
E[U(test)] with ART = (1   p0)[V (p1(0))   p1(0)   c] + p0[V (p1(1))      c + ]: (6)
13Suppose the individual takes a HIV test and nds that he is HIV negative. Given the set-up
of the model, to receive the utility benet of beginning ART the individual needs to be HIV
positive before engaging in his choice of risky behavior, p1. Thus, conditional on testing
HIV negative his expected utility when there is ART is identical to that if there were no
ART (i.e., V (p1(0))   p1(0)   c). Now suppose the individual takes a HIV test and nds
that he is HIV positive. Then the individual will receive the treatment benet of testing
with certainty and his expected utility conditional on testing HIV positive when treatment
is available is given by
V (p1(1))      c + : (7)
The expected utility of testing when there is ART is the linear combination of these two
conditional expectations where the weights are the prior probabilities of being HIV negative
and of being HIV positive, respectively. Assuming V (p1(0))   p1(0) > V (p1(1))    + 
(i.e., the individual would prefer to engage in p1(0) and acquire HIV with probability p1(0)
than to engage in p1(1) and acquire HIV (and begin ART) with certainty), implies that
@E[U(test)] with ART
@p0 < 0.
The model predicts that when ART is available (and there is no rationing) demand for
testing should be lowest among individuals with the lowest prior probabilities of being HIV
positive. For an individual with a low value of p0, the expected treatment benet of testing is
relatively low and the expected change in demand for risky behavior associated with taking
a HIV test is also relatively low. For an individual with a high value of p0, the expected
treatment benet of testing is relatively high but the expected change in demand for risky
behavior associated with taking a HIV test is relatively low. Whether individuals with high
values of p0 or individuals with values of p0 in the middle of the p0 distribution have the
greatest demand for HIV testing when ART is available depends on the magnitude of the
treatment benet of testing relative to the benet associated with the expected change in
demand for risky behavior if the individual were to take a HIV test.
3.4 Change in risky sexual behavior
Linking the upper and lower halves of Figure 6 yields several important insights about the
eect of HIV testing on risky sexual behavior. First, consider the state of the world in which
ART is not available. The individual chooses to take a HIV test if and only if E[U(test)] 
E[U(not test)]. That is, the individual will test if and only p0 2 A. The associated expected
change in risky behavior for this individual is (1   p0)p1(0) + p0p1(1)   p1(p0).
14Now suppose that ART is available. As in the absence of ART, if p0 2 A then the
individual will choose to take a HIV test. Moreover, if p0 2 A1 or p0 2 A2 then the
individual will also test. If individuals are uniformly distributed on the unit interval, the
number of individuals in the interval A1 is greater than those in the interval A2 and hence
the number of individuals induced to test with p0 > maxfp0 j p0 2 Ag is greater than those
induced to test with p0 < minfp0 j p0 2 Ag. Because the introduction of ART increases the
mean p0 among those individuals taking a HIV test as compared to the \no ART" case, the
per-person reduction in risky behavior associated with HIV testing when ART is available
is greater than that in the absence of ART.
3.5 Eect of ART rationing
We may use Figure 6 to examine the eects of ART rationing on demand for HIV testing
and for risky behavior. In particular, we may examine the eect a rationing mechanism that
favors individuals who happen to have relatively low prior probabilities of being HIV positive
(e.g., males age 40-59). As compared to the no-rationing case, such a rationing mechanism
would serve to reduce the expected treatment benet of testing among individuals with
relatively high values of p0 while aecting the expected treatment benet of testing among
low-p0 individuals less. Because it reduces the expected treatment benet of testing more
among individuals expected to demonstrate larger reductions in post-testing risky behavior,
a rationing mechanism of this sort reduces the prevention impact of ART-induced testing.
More generally, any other factors that increase (decrease) the cost (benet) of treatment
for high-p0 individuals relative to low-p0 individuals reduce the prevention impact of ART-
induced testing.
4 Data and estimation
4.1 Data
I use data on the outcomes of individuals' testing decisions (i.e., whether or not they chose to
take a HIV test) and data on HIV prevalence by demographic group to estimate the structural
parameters of the model. I do not observe choices about post-testing risky behavior. In
addition, I do not observe the results of the voluntary tests reported in the Zambia Sexual
Behavior Surveys (ZSBS).
The 2001 Zambia Demographic Health Survey (ZDHS) includes the results of anonymous
15HIV testing linked to information on the age, gender, and province of residence of each
individual tested. The sample of individuals for whom a HIV test was requested was dened
to be all men and all women in one-half of households selected for the men's survey module in
the ZDHS. In total, approximately 5,000 individuals were asked to provide a blood sample.
Among women approached to provide a sample, 15.4 percent refused and 5.3 percent were
either absent or the result is missing. Among men approached to provide to a sample, 14.8
percent refused and 12.1 percent were either absent or the result is missing. The resulting
sample consists of testing results for 3,949 observations.
Because the sample size for any given age-gender-province interaction is small, individuals
are grouped into ve-year age ranges (e.g., 15-19 years old, 20-24 years old, etc.). The ZDHS
includes women age 15-49 and men age 15-59 and there are nine provinces in Zambia, so this
procedure yields 144 groups with HIV prevalence ranging from zero percent to 35.3 percent.
For each group I treat the proportion that were found to be HIV positive as the initial
probability of being HIV positive, p0.9 I assume that the age-prole of HIV prevalence
is static for a given gender-province interaction over the period covered by the repeated
cross-sectional testing data in the ZSBS.
The data on whether an individual voluntarily chose to take a HIV test come from the
ZSBS. I use the three most recent rounds of the ZSBS: 2000, 2003, and 2005. The sample
sizes for each of these survey rounds are 3316, 4471, and 4208 individuals, respectively.
To match the testing data to the prevalence data the testing decisions of individuals in the
ZSBS are aggregated by demographic group dened as the interaction of ve-year age group,
gender, and province of residence. For each demographic group I aggregate the two pre-ART
survey years (i.e., 2000 and 2003). I then calculate the proportion of individuals who report
taking a HIV test in the 12 months prior to the survey date, denoted testi. This procedure
yields 288 observations.
4.2 Estimation
For a group of individuals with the homogeneous belief they are HIV positive equal to p0i,
the proportion predicted to choose to take a HIV test in the pre-ART period is given by
9It is reasonable to believe that on average individuals hold beliefs that are consistent with actual infection
probabilities. Nonetheless, it is reassuring that Delavande and Kohler (2007) report that nely measured
beliefs about own HIV status in the 2006 Malawi Diusion and Ideational Change (MDICP) data are very
similar to HIV prevalence rates in the sample population.
16d testi =
1
1 + e (E[U(test)]i E[U(not test)]i)= (8)
where  is a smoothing parameter that is to be estimated along with the other parameters of
the model. The empirical specication for E[U(test)]) includes as additive terms an indicator
variable equal to one if the observation is a male demographic group, denoted male, and an
indicator variable, denoted post, equal to one if the observation comes from the 2005 survey
round of the ZSBS.
In the ART era, the predicted proportion testing in group i is generated by Equation (8)
as well, but with an expanded expression for E[U(test)] with ART substituted for E[U(test)].
As discussed previously, the changes in the testing-age proles discussed in Section 3 dier
from those predicted by the theoretical model. The model predicts that the individuals
who demonstrate the greatest testing response to the introduction of ART should have prior
probabilities of being HIV positive that are at least as large as those among individuals who
were more likely to test prior to the introduction of ART. In contrast, the observed testing
response among males do not t this prediction. One explanation for this puzzle is that
there exists a non-random rationing mechanism for allocating ART. More generally, we may
expect that there exists unobserved heterogeneity in the benets and costs of ART that are
correlated with demographic characteristics.
To capture this possibility, I estimate the probability that the individual in group i will
seek and receive ART conditional on p0i, denoted p
0
0i, by including measures of each indi-
vidual's age, age squared, gender, and interaction terms in the empirical specication for
the expected utility of testing when ART is available. Specically, I include the right-
hand side of following expression as an additive term in the empirical specication for





1 + eXi (9)
where Xi is a vector whose elements include age, age-squared, an indicator variable for male,
and the interactions of age (and age-squared) with the male indicator variable. In addition, I
examine the relative importance of these demographic characteristics by estimating weights
for the eects of the prior probability of being HIV positive (i.e., p0) and of the demographic-
based probability of seeking and receiving ART conditional on p0 (i.e., p
0
0). These weights
are denoted (1 ) and , respectively. Recalling that  denotes the net utility of beginning
ART conditional on being HIV positive, the expanded expression for E[U(test)] with ART
that I use in the empirical specication is
17E[U(test)] with ART = (1   p0)[V (p1(0))   p1(0)   c] + p0[V (p1(1))      c]
+ (1   )p0 + p0p
0
0: (10)
Because the ultimate product of the empirical analysis is a set of policy simulations, I
need to parameterize the model. In particular, I need to specify a functional form for the
utility derived from choice of risky behavior, V (p1). I choose a functional form for V (p1) that
is suciently exible to allow a variety of shapes for the risky behavior demand function,






The exibility of this specication means that I am able to let the data conrm that the
risky behavior demand function is in fact increasing and concave in p0, as was assumed in
the discussion of the model in Section 4.
To estimate the structural parameters of the model, I search for the parameters that





(testi   d testi)
2 (12)
where the weights are given by the proportion of the total adult population (pop) that is in
p0 group i (popi).
5 Results
5.1 Parameter estimates
Table 1 provides the parameter estimates from the weighted non-linear least squares mini-
mization problem. Column (1) lists the estimates for the baseline model with no additional
controls. The baseline model includes the variables indicated by the theoretical model. Sub-
stituting these parameters into Equation (2) and examining the rst and second derivatives
veries that the expected utility of not testing is decreasing and convex in the prior proba-
bility of being HIV positive. In addition, the utility cost of testing is positive (i.e., c > 0)
and utility is decreasing in the probability that the individual eventually acquires HIV (i.e.,
 > 0).
18[TABLE 1 APPROXIMATELY HERE]
The parameter estimates indicate that individual behavior is broadly consistent with a
model in which not all HIV positive individuals seek and receive ART, but instead there
exist systematic heterogeneity across demographic groups in the probability of seeking and
receiving ART conditional on being HIV positive. In the baseline specication, the esti-
mated  equals 0.955. In other words, the probability that an individual responds to the
availability of ART by testing is increasing in the probability that he is HIV positive but is
also correlated with the individual's demographic characteristics conditional on p0. Of course
the fact that  < 1 indicates that individual behavior is consistent with a model where the
probability that an individual is HIV positive also aects the testing decision irrespective
of these demographic characteristics. Nonetheless, this eect appears to be small and the
estimated  is consistent with the existence of a non-random ART rationing mechanism, or
some other source of systematic heterogeneity across demographic groups in the probability
of seeking and receiving ART conditional on being HIV positive.
If province-level unobserved heterogeneity in testing demand is correlated with variables
in the model, then the estimates presented in Column (1) are biased. For example, we know
that there was an expansion in Zambia in the number of VCT sites between the pre-ART
and ART periods, eectively lowering the travel cost of testing. Thus, the estimate of the
utility benet of beginning ART shown in Column (1) may be biased upwards. To address
this concern, Column (2) presents parameter estimates from Model (2) which includes a
\post" indicator variable, equal to one if the observation comes from the 2005 survey round
of the ZSBS. Model (2) also includes a \male" xed eect, xed eects at the ve-year age
group level, and province xed eects.
One reason the gender, age, and province xed eects are important is that the prior
probability of being HIV positive used in the estimation procedure is essentially given by
the individual-level reduced form regression of HIV status on the interaction of gender,
ve-year age group, and province of residence. Social stigma, control over sexual decision-
making, biological dierences in HIV transmission/progression, and concerns about mother-
to-child transmission are all reasons to believe that the net benet of testing varies by
gender. Likewise, it is highly probable that the net benet of testing/treatment varies by
age. For example, as one approaches one's expected date of death, the personal health cost
of acquiring HIV should be decreasing; in the limiting case, the health cost of acquiring
HIV on the last day of life should be zero, ignoring concerns about transmitting the virus
to others. Finally, the possibility of inter-regional heterogeneity in average distances to the
19nearest VCT and ART sites means that the net benet of testing may vary by province of
residence.
As shown in Column (2), the basic results of the model do not change after it is re-
estimated with time, gender, age group, and province xed eects. The expected utility
of not testing is still decreasing and convex in the prior probability of being HIV positive,
 and c still have the expected signs, and individual behavior remains consistent with a
model in which there exists substantial rationing of treatment based on age. It is reasonable
to consider whether these results are robust to the inclusion of additional xed eects (e.g.,
interactions of the xed eects included in Model (2)). However, the computational demands
of structural estimation for this non-linear model mean that it is dicult to reliably estimate
these additional parameters. In any case, that the parameter estimates changed very little
with the controls included in Model (2) suggests that interacting these controls would not
have a substantial eect on the parameter estimates.
5.2 Predicted testing-age proles
Comparing the predicted and observed testing rates is a simple method of assessing the t
of the empirical specication discussed above. Figure 7 presents predicted and observed
testing-age proles for females and for males in the pre-ART period and in the ART era.
The predicted testing-age prole in a given period in Figure 7 is the result of a locally
weighted smoothed regression of the predicted testing rate for group i on age. The observed
testing-age prole in a given period in Figure 7 is the result of a locally weighted smoothed
regression of the actual testing rate for group i on age. For a given gender there are two
panels in Figure 7, one panel for each of the two empirical specications discussed above.
[FIGURE 7 APPROXIMATELY HERE]
Each of the empirical specications appear to generate predicted values that are relatively
close to the observed HIV testing rates. The predicted testing rates tend to be within one
percentage point or less of the observed testing rate. The mean residuals are largest for the
youngest females in the ART era. In general, the empirical specications generate predicted
testing-age proles in the pre-ART period that take the inverted U-shape that characterizes
the observed testing-age proles and predicted testing-age proles in the ART era that take
the distinct shapes that characterize the observed testing-age proles for females and males.
205.3 Predicted risky behavior demand function
Figure 8 presents the predicted risky behavior demand function, c p1(p0), from the empirical
specication that includes the full set of controls. Although the empirical specication does
not impose that c p1(p0) be increasing or concave in p0, the estimated risky behavior demand
function is in fact increasing and concave. The estimated risky behavior demand function
implies that if an individual knew with certainty that they were HIV negative then they
would choose an amount of risky sexual behavior in which to engage that would imply that
they would acquire HIV with probability 0.128. On the other hand, if an individual believed
with certainty that they were HIV positive then they would choose an amount of risky sexual
behavior in which to engage that would imply that they would acquire HIV with probability
0.591 if they were in fact not HIV positive. The prior probability of being HIV positive
that maximizes the expected reduction in risky behavior associated with taking a HIV test
is 0.428. However, even at its maximum the expected reduction in risky behavior associated
with taking a HIV test in terms of the change in the probability the reference individual
acquires HIV - 0.060 - is relatively small.
[FIGURE 8 APPROXIMATELY HERE]
6 Policy scenarios
This section uses the parameter estimates from the preceding section to examine the behav-
ioral and welfare implications of ve alternative ART policies: (i) no ART, (ii) the status
quo ART policy, (iii) expanding the supply of ART, (iv) eliminating heterogeneity in the
probability of seeking and receiving ART conditional on being HIV positive that is corre-
lated with demographic characteristics (i.e., eliminating the prevention ineciency), and (v)
simultaneously eliminating this prevention ineciency while expanding the supply of ART.
I employ three metrics to examine the performance of each of these policies. The rst metric
is the predicted demand for HIV testing (i.e., the HIV testing rate). The second metric is the
mean predicted choice of risky behavior. The third metric is the simulated number of new
infections. The rst two metrics are relatively straightforward to calculate. The simulated
number of new infections, however, requires particular discussion.
I simulate the eect of testing on new infections as follows. Each individual in a given
demographic group may be characterized along two dimensions: whether they take a HIV
test or not and whether they are HIV positive or not. In a given demographic group, whether
an individual chooses to take a HIV test or not (as well as the result of the test) aects the
21individual's choice of risky behavior. Only individuals who are HIV negative are at risk of
acquiring a new infection.
The number of new infections among individuals taking a HIV test is given by
N X
i=1
ni d testi(1   p0i)c p1(0) (13)
where ni is the number of individuals in group i and N equals 144, the number of demographic
groups. For demographic group i, the product of the rst three terms in this expression
yields the number of individuals in this group that are at-risk of acquiring HIV. Because
these individuals are HIV negative and the results of the HIV tests reveal this fact to each of
the individuals, they choose to engage in an amount of risky behavior summarized by c p1(0);
this is the probability that they acquire HIV.
The number of new infections among individuals not taking a HIV test is given by
N X
i=1
ni(1   d testi)(1   p0i)c p1(p0i): (14)
Again, the product of the rst three terms in this expression yields the number of individuals
in demographic group i that are at-risk of acquiring HIV. Because these individuals choose
not to take a HIV test, they engage in an amount of risky behavior summarized by c p1(p0);
this is the probability that they acquire HIV. Total new infections are given by the sum of
these two expressions.
This method of simulating the number of new infections has one major shortcoming.
Namely, it ignores new infections among partners of the reference individuals. Thus, this
method measures the expected number of new infections in a given population with some
error.
6.1 No ART
The rst policy scenario I examine is a scenario where there is no ART. Applying the three
metrics to this case provides a baseline for understanding the impact of each of four other
ART policies. I calculate the predicted HIV testing rate in the \no ART" scenario by shutting
down the treatment benet to testing (i.e., setting  equal to zero), setting \post" equal to
one, and generating predicted values using Equation (8). The rst row of Table 2 presents
the results of this calculation for each of the two empirical specications. Model (1) is the
baseline empirical specication with no additional controls. Using the parameter estimates
from this specication, the predicted HIV testing rate in the state of the world where there
22is no ART is 5.7 percent. Model (2) includes \post", \male", age group, and province xed
eects, as well as the controls included in Model (1). As Column (2) of Table 2 indicates,
the predicted testing rate remains virtually unchanged at 5.8 percent.
[TABLE 2 APPROXIMATELY HERE]
The second metric is the mean choice of risky behavior. The rst row of Table 3 presents
the mean choice of risky behavior under the \no ART" scenario for each of the two empirical
specications. The parameter estimates from Model (1) imply that the mean choice of risky
behavior would be 0.217. This implies that the representative individual would choose to
engage in an amount of risky behavior that would lead them to acquire HIV with probability
0.217 if they were in fact HIV negative at the time of this choice. As in the case of the
average testing rate, the inclusion of gender, age, and province xed eects does little to
change predicted behavior: Model (2) implies only a slightly higher mean choice of risky
behavior, 0.223.
[TABLE 3 APPROXIMATELY HERE]
The third metric is the simulated number of new infections. Table 4 presents the results
of this simulation; the rst row of this table represents the \no ART" scenario. According
to the parameter estimates from Model (1), the number of new infections in the state of
the world where there is no ART appears to be relatively large: 907,000 new infections.
Of course the theoretical model allows for one chance to take a HIV test and one chance
to make a decision about future risky behavior. Thus, it may make sense to think about
the simulated number of new infections as representing the number of new infections in the
population over the course of the average lifetime of an individual in the population. Given
that on average an individual between the age of 15 and 59 in Zambia is expected to live
approximately 25 more years (WHO 2007), then the simulated annual incidence is nearly
40,000. As a point of comparison, the annual incidence of new adult HIV cases in Zambia
is approximately 50,000. Consistent with the higher mean choice of risky behavior in Model
(2) as compared to Model (1), the simulated number of new infections in Model (2), 934,000
infections, is greater than that in Model (1).
[TABLE 4 APPROXIMATELY HERE]
236.2 Status quo ART policy
The second policy scenario I consider is the status quo ART policy. To calculate the three
metrics under this policy scenario, I set \post" equal to one and make no additional changes.
The second row in Table 2 presents the predicted proportion of individuals choosing to take
a HIV test under this scenario. Depending on the empirical specication, between 8.0 and
8.5 percent of individuals are predicted to take a HIV test. This represents an increase in
testing demand of between 2.3 and 2.7 percentage points (an increase of between 40 and 47
percent).
Although the eect is not nearly as large, ART provision under the status quo ART
policy is also predicted to reduce mean choice of risky behavior. As presented in the second
row of Table 3, Models (1) and (2) imply that the mean choice of risky behavior would fall
by approximately 0.45 percent (or approximately one-thousandth of a percentage point).
The second row of Table 4 presents the simulated number of new infections under the
status quo ART policy. Depending on the empirical specication, the number of new infec-
tions ranges from 894,000 to 918,000. These gures represent a decline in the incidence of
HIV of between 1.43 and 1.71 percent. In general the eect of ART-induced testing under
the status quo ART policy appears to be modest at best. However, comparing these gures
with the performance of the alternative policies should yield a more complete understanding
of the relative magnitude of this eect.
6.3 Expanding the supply of ART
The third policy scenario I examine is expanding the supply of ART while retaining the ex-
isting source of prevention ineciency in the process determining the allocation of ART. If
the quantity of antiretroviral drugs available in Zambia is not sucient to meet the demand
for ART, then treatment providers may ration ART among the pool of eligible individu-
als without regards to each individual's identity. I consider the policy of expanding supply
to ensure that all individuals who would be allocated ART under the existing non-random
rationing mechanism are able to begin treatment. Expanding the supply of ART should
yield an increase in the prevention impact of ART-induced testing as compared to the sta-
tus quo ART policy. Because expanding the supply of ART increases the probability that
an individual will receive the payo associated with taking a HIV test conditional on the
prior probability the individual is HIV positive (and on the probability that they would be
allocated ART under the non-random rationing mechanism), it should increase the propor-
tion of individuals testing. The cost of this policy is the increase in drug expenditures (and
24associated labor costs) required to cover these additional patients.
It appears that the quantity of antiretroviral drugs in Zambia is not sucient to meet
the demand for ART. I calculate the ratio of the number of individuals on ART at the time
of the 2005 round of the ZSBS (i.e., 30,000) to the number of individuals who are predicted









where N equals 144, the number of demographic groups. Consistent with the existence of
excess demand for ART, I nd that this ratio is substantially less than one (q = 0:599). If
there are individuals who did not take a HIV test in the 12 month interval but were still
eligible for ART and able to demonstrate their status to the health authorities (e.g., from
the results of a test taken prior to the beginning of the 12 month interval), then the q given
by Equation (15) is going to understate the extent of rationing of ART using a random
lottery. On the other hand, not all HIV positive individuals are recommended to begin ART
and so the q given by Equation (15) may overstate the extent of rationing of ART using a
random lottery. After discussing the simulation results associated with the assumption that
q=0.599, I will examine the robustness of the results to changes in this assumption.
To calculate the expected level of testing associated with ART availability under the
expanded supply scenario, rst I substitute the parameter estimates from Table 1 (except
the estimated ) into the predicted testing equation and set \post" equal to one. Then
I substitute 1
0:599 b  for  in the predicted testing equation (where b  is the estimated ).
Because the eect of rationing without regards to individuals characteristics is not separately
identied from the benet of beginning ART (i.e., ), eliminating the rationing of ART using
a random lottery is equivalent to increasing . The third set of rows of Table 2 present the
results of this exercise. Depending on the empirical specication, I predict that expanding
the supply of ART while retaining the existing non-random ART rationing mechanism should
increase testing rates to between 10.1 and 11.2 percent. This represents an increase in testing
rates as compared to the status quo ART policy of between 2.1 and 2.7 percentage points.
The third set of rows in Table 3 presents the mean choice of risky behavior under the
\expand supply" scenario. Although the mean choice of risky behavior in this scenario
is smaller than that under either the \no ART" or the \status quo ART" scenarios, the
reduction in mean risky behavior is still small in an absolute sense. As compared to the
\no ART" scenario, mean risky behavior is approximately 0.90 percent smaller under the
25\expand supply" scenario.
The simulation results fail to provide support for the idea that the continued roll-out of
ART (in the absence of other interventions designed to eliminate the non-random allocation
process) will induce substantial reductions in the incidence of new HIV infections. As shown
in the third set of rows in Table 4, the number of new infections avoided under this policy as
compared to the state of the world without ART is only between 2.76 and 3.43 percent. In
relative terms, however, this policy is much more eective than the status quo ART policy:
simply expanding the supply of ART to eliminate the random lottery increases the number
of new infections avoided by more than 90 percent.
Of course the assumption that q = 0:599 may be incorrect. If excess demand is less than
that consistent with this assumption (i.e., if the \true" q is greater than 0:599), then the
simulated eects of expanding the supply of ART as reported in Tables (2) through (4) are
simply overestimates. In the limiting case that there exists no excess demand (conditional on
the non-random rationing mechanism), then we cannot consider the eects of expanding the
supply of ART without addressing the non-random rationing mechanism (i.e., the simulated
eects of this policy are zero).
If excess demand for ART is greater than what I assume, then the simulated eects
of expanding the supply of ART as reported in Tables (2) through (4) are underestimates
of what we may reasonably believe. To examine the sensitivity of the simulation results
to changes in q, the simulations were re-implemented using q = 0:40. This choice of q is
fairly arbitrary, but the quantitative simulation results change very little and the qualitative
simulation results remain the same: simply expanding the supply of ART has only modest
prevention eects above and beyond the status quo ART policy.
6.4 Eliminating the prevention ineciency
The fourth policy scenario is to eliminate the existing source of prevention ineciency in the
ART allocation process while holding constant the quantity of ART supplied. Under this
policy, all individuals who are HIV positive are eligible for ART. Age and gender no longer
aect the probability of seeking and receiving ART conditional on HIV status. If the non-
random rationing story is correct, one way to implement this policy would be to mandate that
the enrollment-age prole at ART sites in each province match the province's prevalence-age
prole. Because the existing supply of ART is held constant, eliminating the ineciency
would require no additional expenditure on antiretroviral drugs. The tradeo or cost of this
policy is that individuals who are currently favored in the ART allocation process would face
26a lower probability of beginning ART conditional on being HIV positive. Moreover, because
the quantity of ART supplied is held constant while the number of individuals eligible for
ART increases, the probability that an HIV positive individual who takes a HIV test is
allocated ART in the random lottery decreases.
Eliminating the source of ineciency in the process determining the allocation of ART has
the potential to yield a large increase in the number of new infections avoided. The model
provided in this paper indicates that the expected reduction in risky behavior associated
with taking a HIV test is increasing in the initial probability of being HIV positive over
the range relevant in the current setting. However, empirical evidence suggests that current
ART policy eectively favors populations (i.e., older males) with prior probabilities of being
HIV positive that are much lower than the maximum prior probability observed in the
Zambia DHS. Thus, eliminating the source of the ineciency will increase the number of
new infections avoided due to ART-induced testing in part because the composition of the
pool of individuals choosing to take a HIV test will shift toward individuals expected to
demonstrate relatively large reductions in post-testing risky behavior. In addition, there
are many more individuals in groups that are predicted to voluntarily test at high rates in
the absence of the source of ineciency (e.g., males in the middle of the age distribution)
than there are in the group (i.e., older males) that currently tests at a high rate. Hence,
eliminating the source of ineciency will increase the number of new infections avoided due to
ART-induced testing in part because the number of individuals testing after the ineciency
is addressed would be much greater than the number that test under the status quo ART
policy.
I operationalize this policy experiment by generating predicted testing values using the
parameter estimates from Table 1 (except the estimated ), setting \post" equal to one,
 = 0, and recalibrating q. I recalibrate q to reect the fact that if the policy eliminates the
non-random rationing mechanism then the number of individuals who respond to ART by
testing will be greater. The new value of q is 0.3. Because the quantity of ART supplied is
held constant in this policy, the increase in testing demand means a decrease in the chance
of being selected in the random lottery. Therefore, I substitute 0:3b  for  in the predicted
testing equation. Again, because the eect of a random lottery determining the allocation of
ART among HIV positive individuals is not separately identied from the benet of beginning
ART (i.e., ), the eect of decreasing the probability an individual is selected in the lottery
is equivalent to decreasing the benet of beginning ART.
Regardless of the metric under consideration, the simulated results of this policy provide
27clear evidence of the welfare cost of the non-random rationing mechanism revealed in this
research. Predicted testing demand is between 16.9 and 18.6 percent, a roughly two-fold
increase over testing rates under the status quo ART policy. The percent reduction in mean
risky behavior as compared to the \no ART" policy is between 2.69 and 2.76, at least six
times greater than the reduction under the status quo ART policy. As compared to the
status quo policy, the number of new infections avoided due to ART-induced testing would
be more than four times as large if the non-random rationing mechanism were eliminated:
between 69,000 and 78,000 new infections avoided.
6.5 Eliminating the prevention ineciency while expanding the
supply of ART
The fth policy scenario is to expand the supply of ART in combination with eliminating the
existing source of ineciency. In particular, I consider an expansion in the supply of ART
that is sucient to ensure that all individuals who are HIV positive would be able to begin
ART. This policy yields the both the mechanical benet of increasing ART-induced testing
by eliminating the random lottery for ART as well as the composition benet of inducing
additional testing among individuals expected to demonstrate greater post-testing reduction
in risky behavior. Of course this policy requires the greatest increase in expenditure. The
increase in expenditure on antiretroviral drugs (and the associated labor costs) is greater
than that under the policy of expanding the supply of ART while retaining the existing
source of ineciency. Moreover, eliminating the source of ineciency may itself be costly.
To simulate the eect of this new policy, I set \post" equal to one,  = 0, replace  with
1
0:599 b , and substitute the parameter estimates from Table 1 for the remaining parameters.
The simulation results indicate that testing demand under this policy would be between 25.4
and 28.1 percent, a more than four-fold increase as compared to the \no ART" policy. The
mean choice of risky behavior would be between 4.04 and 4.61 percent smaller than under
the \no ART" policy. In terms of new infections avoided, this policy would have very large
eects: the number of new infections would be at least 12 percent (11 percent) smaller than
that under the \no ART" scenario (\status quo" scenario).
7 Alternative explanations
The change in testing behavior associated with the introduction of ART in Zambia is con-
sistent with the existence of a non-random rationing mechanism determining the allocation
28of ART among HIV positive individuals who test and are clinically eligible for ART. Testing
decisions among older men appear to be particularly responsive to the introduction of ART
despite the fact that older men are relatively unlikely to be HIV positive. In contrast, testing
decisions among men in the middle of the age distribution (e.g., ages 30-35) are much less
responsive to the introduction of ART despite the fact that these men are one of the higher
HIV prevalence groups. In this section I consider alternative explanations for this puzzle.
1. Concurrent public health campaign specically targeting older men. If other
anti-HIV/AIDS campaigns targeting older men intensied in parallel to the introduction of
ART, this might explain the puzzlingly large increase in testing rates among older men. First,
this seems unlikely on a priori grounds. Older men are one of the lowest HIV prevalence
groups in Zambia so they are not at particularly high risk of infecting others. Similarly, their
female partners (6 years younger on average) are also relatively unlikely to be HIV positive
so older men are not at particularly high risk of acquiring HIV. Finally, all else equal, a
prevention-oriented policymaker would target young adults in public eorts at sustained
behavior change because they have the greatest expected remaining lifespan and hence the
greatest prevention payo from a given prevention investment.10
In any case, the ZSBS data include information on exposure to HIV prevention interven-
tions so it is possible to directly test this hypothesis. An analysis of these data reveals that
older males do not appear to be have been targeted in HIV prevention campaigns imple-
mented simultaneously with the introduction of ART. The fraction of males aged 15-44 who
knew of a location where they could take a HIV test increased from 77 percent in the two
pre-ART rounds of the ZSBS (i.e., 2000 and 2003) to 87 percent in the 2005 ZSBS. In com-
parison, this gure for males aged 45-59 increased from 79 percent prior to the introduction
of ART to 87 percent in the 2005 ZSBS. Although knowledge of testing locations increased
over time, the secular increase does not explain the increase in testing rates among older
men.
Likewise, data from the ZSBS on the four large information campaigns included in both a
pre-ART round (i.e., 2003) and an ART-era round (i.e., 2005) do not support the hypothesis
that anti-HIV/AIDS campaigns targeted older males.11 The proportion of males aged 15-44
(45-59) who had ever seen or listened to the \HEART" program decreased from 29 (32)
percent in 2003 to 27 (29) percent in 2005. The proportion of males aged 15-44 (45-59)
who had ever seen or listened to the \Your Health Matters" program decreased from 63 (66)
percent in 2003 to 57 (53) percent in 2005. The proportion of males aged 15-44 (45-59) who
10Anecdotal evidence from conversations with policymakers in Zambia is consistent with this conjecture.
11The 2005 ZSBS asked about none of the information campaigns included in the 2000 ZSBS.
29had ever seen or listened to the \Kabanana" program decreased from 51 (44) percent in 2003
to 44 (39) percent in 2005. The proportion of males aged 15-44 (45-59) who had ever seen or
listened to the \Lifeline" program decreased from 37 (40) percent in 2003 to 30 (25) percent
in 2005.
2. VCT and/or ART expansion correlated with HIV prevalence. At the mo-
ment, there do not exist spatial data on the change in VCT and ART availability over time.
All that exist are the JICA Health Facilities Census data on the spatial distribution at a
single point in time. However, discussions with policymakers at the Ministry of Health and
with the main ART providers (e.g., the Center for Infectious Disease Research in Zambia
(CIDRZ)) indicate that the initial VCT expansion occurred in major urban areas (i.e., Kitwe,
Lusaka, Ndola), the initial ART expansion occurred in these same areas, and a follow-up
VCT expansion occurred at the same time as the ART expansion but in less populated areas.
Although these expansions are likely correlated with HIV prevalence at the province level,
the expanded empirical specication (i.e., Model (2)) includes province xed eects which
addresses any potential bias from the possible province-level correlation between VCT (or
ART) expansion and HIV prevalence, which is measured at the province level.
Even if ART rationing favoring older men is not the reason older men disproportionately
increased their testing rates in parallel to the introduction of ART in Zambia, the conclusion
that this increase came at the cost of forgone prevention holds. The model I present is
part of a general class of models where the net private benet of testing conditional on
belief about own HIV status varies by demographic group. Within this class of models, the
estimated risky behavior demand function does not depend on whether the inference that
ART rationing is what is driving this heterogeneous testing behavior is correct. Therefore,
the conclusion that there is a foregone prevention impact of having older men test instead
of men who are more likely to be HIV positive (e.g., men ages 35-40) would still hold even
if ART rationing is not the explanation for the puzzle this paper identies. Nonetheless,
ART rationing appears to be a likely explanation for the changes in the observed testing-age
proles associated with the introduction of ART in Zambia.
8 Conclusion
The debate about appropriate HIV/AIDS policy often features an analytic framework in
which interventions are classied as treatment interventions or as prevention interventions
(Canning 2006). Antiretroviral therapy (ART) and care for opportunistic infections (e.g.,
30tuberculosis) are usually seen as treatment interventions. HIV testing and condoms are usu-
ally seen as prevention interventions. However, many proponents of HIV testing argue that
antiretrovirals are not simply a treatment intervention and that expanding access to ART
in the developing world will induce substantial increases in testing demand and subsequent
reductions in risky behavior.
This paper formalizes this intuition using a consumer demand model of sexual behavior
decision-making under uncertainty and provides evidence on the magnitude of this eect.
In doing so, it generates three broader insights about the economics of HIV/AIDS and
health economics more generally. First, the structural model demonstrates that we can
recover the parameters of the risky behavior demand function without actually observing
risky sexual behavior. Thus, the technique I employ in this paper provides a solution for those
concerned about measurement error in self-reported sexual behavior. Second, in contrast
to existing analyses of the eect of treatment interventions on preventive behavior, this
paper shows that treatment for an infectious disease may actually increase private preventive
behavior. The availability of treatment induces individuals to acquire more information
about their infection status and this information may lead to increased private prevention
eorts. Third, the analysis indicates that standard voluntary counseling and testing (VCT)
programs yield greater behavior change per person than if we made everyone test or oered
nancial incentives for testing. Because existing analyses of the eects of HIV testing on
risky behavior largely estimate the average treatment eect under the latter two regimes,
these analyses tend to understate the ecacy of the predominant approach to HIV testing.
From a more policy-oriented perspective, the results of the current analysis indicate that
the prevention impact of antiretrovirals under the existing ART policy in Zambia is modest
at best. The observed changes in testing rates associated with the introduction of ART are
not consistent with the prediction of a model of testing demand where the incentive eect
of ART is increasing in the prior probability that the individual is HIV positive. Instead,
from the perspective of maximizing the prevention impact of ART-induced testing, there
appears to exist a source of ineciency in the process determining who seeks and receives
ART. Because of this ineciency, the number of new infections avoided due to ART-induced
testing is relatively small; those individuals disproportionately likely to seek and receive ART
are predicted to demonstrate only small reductions in risky behavior subsequent to testing.
Simulation results indicate that ART-induced testing under the existing ART policy reduces
the number of new infections by less than 2 percent.
Eliminating the ineciency in the process determining the allocation of ART yields sub-
31stantial increases in the prevention impact of ART. Simulation results indicate that this
intervention would increase the number of new infections avoided due to ART-induced test-
ing more than four-fold. Moreover, this intervention requires no additional expenditure on
antiretroviral drugs. In comparison, expanding the supply of ART without eliminating this
ineciency would only double the number of new infections avoided due to ART-induced
testing while requiring a substantial increase in expenditure on antiretroviral drugs. The
results of this paper conrm the emphasis among policymakers on the central role of ART-
induced HIV testing in reducing the spread of HIV/AIDS and suggest that future research
examine the process determining the allocation of ART in regions experiencing a rapid change
in the availability of ART.
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   Notes: Locally weighted smoothed regression lines of predicted and observed testing rates for 
five-year age groups on age, estimated separately for pre-ART and ART eras.  Model 1 uses 
the parameter estimates from a regression model with the variables in the structural model and 
no controls.  Model 2 uses the parameter estimates from a regression model with the variables 
in the structural model, an ART era fixed effect, a male fixed effect, five-year age group fixed 
effects, and province fixed effects.  
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post dummy no yes
male dummy no yes
age group controls no yes
province controls no yes  
Ob ti 288 288 Observations 288 288
Note: Tested in past 12 months is a binary variable indicating took a HIV
test in the 12 months period preceeding the survey.  Post dummy is an
indicator variable equal to one if the observation comes from the 2005
survey round of the ZSBS.  Age group controls are indicator variables for
five-year age groups (i.e,. 15-19, 20-24, …, 55-59).Table 2: Testing Rates Under Alternative Policy Scenarios
Empirical specification: model 1 model 2
(1) (2)
Policy scenario
No ART 5.7 5.8
Status quo 8.0 8.5 Status quo 8.0 8.5
Percent change compared to "No ART" 40 47
Expand supply 10.1 11.2
Percent change compared to "No ART" 77 93
Eliminate inefficiency 18.6 16.9
Percent change compared to "No ART" 226 191
Expand supply and eliminate inefficiency 28.1 25.4
Percent change compared to "No ART" 393 338
Note: Testing rates reported as percent of females age 15-49 and males
age 15-59 choosing to take a HIV test.  Under the "expand supply" scenario,
the supply of ART is expanded to eliminate the random rationing mechanism.
Under the "eliminate inefficiency" scenario, the total quantity of ART supplied
is the same as in the "status quo" scenario and the non-random rationing is the same as in the  status quo  scenario and the non-random rationing
mechanism is eliminated.  Model 1 uses the parameter estimates from a
regression model with the variables in the structural model and no controls.
Model 2 uses the parameter estimates from a regression model with the
variables in the structural model, an ART era fixed effect, a male fixed effect,
five-year age group fixed effects, and province fixed effects.Table 3: Mean Choice of Risky Behavior Under Alternative Policy Scenarios
Empirical specification: model 1 model 2
(1) (2)
Policy scenario
No ART 0.217 0.223
Status quo 0.216 0.222
Percent change compared to "No ART" -0.46 -0.45
Expand supply 0.215 0.221
Percent change compared to "No ART" -0.92 -0.90
Eliminate inefficiency 0.211 0.217
Percent change compared to "No ART" -2.76 -2.69
Expand supply and eliminate inefficiency 0.207 0.214
Percent change compared to "No ART" -4.61 -4.04
Note: Mean choice of risky behavior is mean probability individual acquires HIV 
through choice of risky behavior, where all individuals treated as if HIV negative
at time of choice.  Under the "expand supply" scenario, the supply of ART is
expanded to eliminate the random rationing mechanism.  Under the "eliminate
inefficiency" scenario, the total quantity of ART supplied is the same as in the
"status quo" scenario and the non-random rationing mechanism is eliminated.
Model 1 uses the parameter estimates from a regression model with the
variables in the structural model and no controls.  Model 2 uses the parameter
estimates from a regression model with the variables in the structural model, an
ART era fixed effect, a male fixed effect, five-year age group fixed effects, and
province fixed effects.Table 4: New Infections Under Alternative Policy Scenarios
Empirical specification: model 1 model 2
(1) (2)
Policy scenario
No ART 907 934
Status quo 894 918
Percent change compared to "No ART" -1.43 -1.71
Expand supply 882 902
Percent change compared to "No ART" -2.76 -3.43
Eliminate inefficiency 829 865
Percent change compared to "No ART" -8.60 -7.39
Expand supply and eliminate inefficiency 773 815
Percent change compared to "No ART" -14.77 -12.74
Note: New infections reported in thousands.  Under the "expand supply"
scenario, the supply of ART is expanded to eliminate the random rationing
mechanism.  Under the "eliminate inefficiency" scenario, the total quantity
of ART supplied is the same as in the "status quo" scenario and the non-random
rationing mechanism is eliminated.  Model 1 uses the parameter estimates
from a regression model with the variables in the structural model and no
controls.  Model 2 uses the parameter estimates from a regression model
with the variables in the structural model, an ART era fixed effect, a male
fixed effect, five-year age group fixed effects, and province fixed effects.